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The interconnectedness of financial institutions affects instability and credit crises. To quantify
systemic risk we introduce here the PD model, a dynamic model that combines credit risk techniques
with a contagion mechanism on the network of exposures among banks. A potential loss distribution
is obtained through a multi-period Monte Carlo simulation that considers the probability of default
(PD) of the banks and their tendency of defaulting in the same time interval. A contagion process
increases the PD of banks exposed toward distressed counterparties. The systemic risk is measured
by statistics of the loss distribution, while the contribution of each node is quantified by the new
measures PDRank and PDImpact. We illustrate how the model works on the network of the
European Global Systemically Important Banks. For a certain range of the banks capital and of their
assets volatility, our results reveal the emergence of a strong contagion regime where lower default
correlation between banks corresponds to higher losses. This is the opposite of the diversification
benefits postulated by standard credit risk models used by banks and regulators who could therefore
underestimate the capital needed to overcome a period of crisis, thereby contributing to the financial
system instability.
PACS numbers: 87.15.A-, 05.40.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
One lesson learned from the recent credit crisis is that
the stability of the financial system cannot be assessed
focussing exclusively on each individual bank or financial
institution. A broader approach to systemic risk, defined
as the risk that a considerable part of the financial system
is disrupted [1], is required, as interconnections and in-
teractions are at least as important in contributing to the
overall dynamics [2–9]. A number of regulatory boards
and committees, such as the Financial Policy Committee
(FPC) at the Bank of England, the European Systemic
Risk Board (ERSB) and the Financial Stability Oversight
Council in the United States, have been created in order
to identify, monitor and take action to remove or reduce
systemic risk. They are looking at new methodologies
and ideas from different disciplines to deepen their un-
derstanding of the complex phenomena involved in finan-
cial crises [10]. In particular techniques borrowed from
network science [11, 12] have been successfully applied to
the study of network resilience to external shocks [13–15]
and have proven useful in the analysis of financial sys-
temic risk [16–21]. In this context, financial institutions
are described as nodes in a network, connected by dif-
ferent kinds of edges, indicating: cross ownership [22],
investments in the same set of assets (overlapping port-
folios) [23–25] or credit exposures (for example loans)
[26–29].
In this article, we will focus on the analysis on the
propagation of the financial distress through direct credit
∗Electronic address: d.petrone@qmul.ac.uk
exposures, where the distressed event is the insolvency of
the financial institutions. We will introduce a new hybrid
framework, the so-called PD model, which constructively
combines together two different and almost complemen-
tary approaches to assess the risk of insolvency of finan-
cial institutions.
The first approach, from now on referred to as network
theory approach, analyses the spread of the contagion of
an external stress in the network of exposures between
banks. The banks can use their capital as a buffer to
absorb the shocks, but they default if the loss is greater
than the capital. Through a cascade mechanism of se-
quential defaults over the network, the initial external
stress can lead to the disruption of a substantial part of
the system.
The second approach, the credit risk approach, is nor-
mally used by banks to estimate their economic capital
(i.e. the capital that is necessary to overcome a period of
crisis without major disruption for the business) against
the risk of default of their counterparties in lending trans-
actions. It is based on assigning a probability of default
to each counterparty and using a model to describe the
tendency of some of them to default together. A time
horizon is chosen for the analysis and a potential loss dis-
tribution is obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. Typ-
ically the economic capital is obtained as the difference
between a quantile of the loss distribution and its mean.
This approach can be used in the financial systemic risk
context imagining the financial institutions as a portfolio
of risky assets owned by the regulators [30].
The two approaches have been developed by two differ-
ent communities of researchers that have been pursued
their research independently, with no significant inter-
action and cross pollination, until now. Our model, the
ar
X
iv
:1
61
0.
00
79
5v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.C
P]
  8
 A
pr
 20
18
2so-called PD model aims at creating a bridge between the
two approaches, making valuable use of all the available
information about the system to analyse and quantify
its systemic risk. At its core the PD model is a credit
risk model with a contagion mechanism that increases
the probability of default of nodes affected by defaults in
their neighbourhood, defined by the exposure network.
One of the main and somewhat counter-intuitive results
of the PD model is that there are situations for which
lower correlations between nodes correspond to higher
risk. As far as we are aware, this fact is not known within
the financial risk management community that is used to
think that a diversified (less correlated) portfolio always
require less capital. As a result, the economic capital
calculations might not be conservative enough, exposing
banks and financial system to the next severe crisis.
II. TWO MODELLING APPROACHES TO
FINANCIAL RISK
The Network Theory approach
Financial institutions are described as the N nodes of
a network as shown in Fig. 1a. The links of the network
are directed and their topology is described by the ma-
trix a = {aij}, where the weight aij equals to the sum
of the exposures of node i to the default of node j. Ex-
ample of exposures are: loans, bonds, share ownership
and derivative contracts. Each node is characterised by
its total asset Ai={1,...,N}, i.e the set of anything a fi-
nancial institution owns and that can be converted to
cash, by a threshold Ei={1,...,N}, denoting the capital of
the bank that can be used to absorb losses, and by a loss
given default LGDi={1,...,N}, representing the percentage
of the total asset that would be lost in case of default. A
node i is considered insolvent and in default if Ei(t) ≤ 0.
To start a contagion process, the system is initially per-
turbed with a sudden loss, and a model that simulates
financial contagion is used to estimate the total loss of
the network.
The models originally proposed to study network sta-
bility [18, 31] relied on a variant of the ’domino effect’ to
propagate the stress and, if the original shock was not big
enough to start the chain reaction, no quantifiable effect
could be calculated. To overcome this limitation Bat-
tiston et al [32] introduced DebtRank, a new measure
of systemic risk. The DebtRank of node i, is a num-
ber measuring the fraction of the total economic value in
the network that is potentially affected by the distress or
the default of node i. The measure presented interest-
ing characteristics such as being expressed in monetary
terms and being able to ’feel’ the stress in the network
also in absence of actual defaults. However, it is not
evident how, in the real world, the propagation of the
stress postulated by the model would happen and how it
would translate in an actual loss for the banks. In order
to fill this gap Bardoscia et al [33] proposed a slightly
modified model and a derivation of the dynamics for the
shock propagation using basic accounting principles. To
obtain their results, the authors had to make the not
fully financially justified assumption that the exposures
towards other banks lose their value proportionally to the
loss in capital suffered by the borrowing banks, namely:
aij(t+ 1) = aij(t)
Ej(t)
Ej(t− 1) (1)
where Ej(t) and aij(t) are, respectively, the capital of
bank j and the exposure that bank i has with bank j
at time t. The above updating equation is used when
bank j has not defaulted in the previous time period,
otherwise aij(t+ 1) is set to be zero. In such approach it
is also crucial to understand how the time step is defined:
is it a year, a quarter or a minute? The answer is not
irrelevant because one of the findings of Ref. [33] is that,
no matter how small the initial shock is, if the modulus
of the largest eigenvalue of the interbank leverage matrix
Λij =
aij
Ei
is greater than one, at least one bank fails.
This is clearly unrealistic in actual financial networks. In
reality, even if it is tempting to interpret t as a time, it
should be considered just as an index identifying a step
in the algorithm. No well defined time length is specified
and the process can be thought as instantaneous.
The Credit Risk approach
Within this approach the system is considered as a
portfolio of investments Ai={1,...,N} and the goal is to
obtain an estimate of the risk, expressed as statistics
(usually quantiles) of the potential loss distribution
within a chosen time period (in the financial industry,
it is usually taken as one year) [34, 35]. As shown in
Fig. 1b, each investment is associated with a probability
of default within the time interval PDi={1,...,N}, a loss
given default LGDi={1,...,N} and a correlation matrix
ρ = {ρij} relative to the stochastic process of the
assets returns. The focus of the credit risk approach,
with respect to the network theory one, is on the
probabilities of default PD, as in this case the nodes are
intrinsically unstable and can default even in absence
of any externally-applied stress. The evaluation of the
probability of default of a counterparty is a crucial ac-
tivity performed routinely by banks, when assessing the
risk involved in lending transactions. The probability of
default can also be obtained from credit rating agencies
(Moody’s, Standard & Poors, Fitch, etc.) that use their
estimation model on historical default data.
In order to define a random process to simulate the
default of banks, which takes into account their tendency
to default during the same time step, the basic idea is to
use correlated random variables Xi={1,...,N} drawn from
a multivariate distribution to drive the defaults. The
loss distribution is obtained performing a Monte Carlo
simulation of the random variables Xi={1,...,N} for one
time period. The asset k defaults when the simulated
3FIG. 1: The PD model merges network theory and
credit risk approaches. (a) In the network theory ap-
proach, the focus is on the propagation of the stress on the
network of exposures {aij} between financial institutions, and
the capital Ei represents the buffer that can be used by bank i
to absorb shocks. (b) The credit risk approach focuses on the
default probabilities PDi and on the tendency of the nodes
to default together as described by a Gaussian latent variable
model with correlation matrix ρ = {ρij}. The objective is to
obtain a loss distribution and its quantiles. (c) The PD model
takes into account both the matrices {aij} and {ρij}, and all
the available information about the nodes, namely total as-
set Ai, capital Ei, loss given default LGDi and probability of
default PDi. For visualization purposes, only the maximum
spanning tree of the correlation network was shown in panel
(b) and (c).
Xk = xk falls below a numeric value that is a function
of PDk.
Gaussian latent variable model: In the so-called
Gaussian latent variable model [36], a multivariate Gaus-
sian distribution with zero mean, unit variance and cor-
relation matrix {ρij}, is used to sample Xi={1,...,N}. The
condition for the default of asset k is chosen as:
δk = 1 ⇐⇒ xk < Φ−1(PDk) (2)
where Φ is the univariate Gaussian distribution, while,
for example, the implied probability PDij of double de-
fault of node i and j is:
PDij = Φ2(Φ
−1(PDi),Φ−1(PDj), ρij) (3)
where Φ2 is the bivariate standard Gaussian distribution.
Statistics of the loss distribution are then used to esti-
mate the capital that is needed to remain solvent during
the chosen time period at a certain level of confidence.
The simulation is repeated a sufficient number of times to
lower the Monte Carlo error below a level that is deemed
acceptable. The Gaussian latent variable model was in-
troduced for the first time by Vasicek [37] in 1987. It has
then been adopted by the portfolio credit risk methodol-
ogy called CreditMetrics [35] and used as the underlying
methodology for the capital requirements of loan posi-
tions by the Basel committee [38, 39].
The main ideas behind the Gaussian latent variable
model were already introduced in 1974 by Merton [40]
with his option model for corporate default based on
the capital structure of a company (see Methods). The
Gaussian latent variable model can be seen as a proxy of
a “multi-company” generalization of the Merton model
where companies default if they experience a high neg-
ative asset return described by the random variables
Xi={1,...,N} with asset return correlation {ρij} [41]. In-
stead of using the asset return correlations for calibrating
the matrix ρ, it is an accepted industry practice to use
equity return correlations [42], where daily time series
data are available (a brief explanation of why equity re-
turn correlations can be used as a substitute for asset
return correlations can be found in Ref. [43]).
III. MERGING THE TWO APPROACHES: THE
PD MODEL FRAMEWORK
Our model combines network theory and credit risk
approaches, using all the available information about the
system. As shown in Fig. 1c, we consider the finan-
cial system as a portfolio of risky assets as if it were
“owned” by the regulators, and we use credit risk tech-
niques to calculate its loss distribution. At the same
time, as in the network theory approach, we consider
each individual bank as a node in a network of expo-
sures. In order to include a contagion mechanism we use
a multi-period Gaussian latent variable model with M
time steps [43]. The length ∆t of the time step is chosen
coherently with the available data about the probabili-
ties PD ≡ PD(t, t + ∆t) of having a default between t
and t + ∆t. Usually ∆t for which PD data is available
is one year. The total length of time T = M∆t is an in-
put of the model and depends by the type of analysis to
be performed. For analysing a systemic crisis we found
that T = 7 years is a reasonable choice. The contagion
mechanism is particularly intuitive and simple: the de-
fault of one node increases the probability of default of
the neighbouring nodes in subsequent time steps [44–47]
according the characteristics of the network of exposures
{aij}. In particular, a node i experiences an impact Ii(t)
4at time t:
Ii(t) =
∑
j
aij(t)δj(t)LGDj(t) (4)
where δj(t) is equal to 1 if node j has defaulted at time
t, and is 0 otherwise. The quantity aij(t) represents the
exposure of node i to the default of node j, and the in-
dex j in the sum includes all the nodes that have not
defaulted at the previous times 0, .., t−∆t. The impact
Ii(t) increases the probability of default PDi(t+ ∆t) at
the successive time step. In our framework, t is a proper
time variable and not just an identifier for a step of an
algorithm, hence it is possible to write an updating equa-
tion for all the basic variables of the system as a function
of the impact I(t):
Ei(t+ ∆t) = Ei(t)− Ii(t)
Ai(t+ ∆t) = Ai(t)− Ii(t) (5)
PDi(t+ ∆t) = f(Ii(t), Ei(t), ...)
In general, it is also possible to introduce updating equa-
tions for the matrix ρ, for LGDi and for the network
a = {aij}, as well as dependencies to evolving macroeco-
nomic scenarios and model financial institutions as com-
plex agents reacting to the contingent situation of the
system.
In this paper, we specialize to the case with ρij , aij and
LGDi as constant in time. For updating the probabili-
ties of default we use two alternative equations that we
have called respectively ”Merton update” and ”Linear
update”.
Merton update: In the Merton update we use Eq. (20)
to update the probabilities of defaults. Assuming ∆t = 1
year, Bi(t) = Bi = Ai(0)−Ei(0) and σi as constants and
with the further assumption that µi = 0, we can write:
PDi(t+ ∆t) = 1− Φ
(
ln(Ai(t)− Ii(t))− lnBi − 0.5σ2i ∆t
σi
√
∆t
)
(6)
We have also set PDi(t + ∆t) = 1 if Ii(t) ≥ Ei, i.e the
bank defaults if the impact is greater than the capital.
The parameters σi can be obtained inverting Eq. (6) at
time t = 0 given PDi(0). Other choices of µ and σ
are also possible. For example the assumption of con-
stant σ is not completely satisfactory as it is reasonable
to expect that the volatility increases when the company
approaches the default. It is possible to devise a more
complex implementation of the model that includes a dy-
namics for σ(t) and µ(t).
Linear update: The Merton update is the financially
”correct” way to update the probabilities of default.
However we have found useful to introduce an alternative
updating equation for PDi(t+ ∆t) where the increase in
PDi is directly proportional to the impact Ii(t). This
can be thought as a proxy version of the Merton update
when the volatility σ is extremely large (see Fig. 2).
PDi(t+ ∆t) = min
[
1, PDi(t) +
(1− PDi(t))Ii(t)
Ei(t)
]
(7)
with PDi(t + ∆t) being capped to 1 when the impact
Ii(t) is greater or equal to Ei(t).
FIG. 2: Probability of default PD of a node as a func-
tion of the impact I expressed as a fraction of the
capital E. When the ratio I/E is equal or greater than 1
we set PD = 1 as the financial institution is insolvent and
it will default during the next time period. The continuous
line describes the Linear update while the dots represent the
Merton update with different values of the asset volatility σ.
Calculation of the loss distribution:
As described in the paragraph relative to the credit
risk approach, the default of financial institution i at time
t corresponds to a drawn value xi of random variable
Xi in the sampling (X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , XN = xN )
smaller than Φ−1(PDi(t)). If at least a node has de-
faulted at time t, we update the variables of the system
for the next time t+ ∆t as in Eqs. (5). Defaulted nodes
are then removed with their respective edges. Instead, if
no node has defaulted at time t, we proceed to the fol-
lowing time step and the new sampling with the same
network and stochastic process parameters. The simu-
lation is then continued for M temporal iterations. The
loss L(t) for the entire network at time t is calculated as:
L(t) =
∑
j
Aj(t)LGDj(t)δj(t) (8)
while the total loss Ltot is obtained by summing up the
discounted values of the losses at the different time peri-
ods:
Ltot(M) =
M∑
t=1
L(t)D(t) (9)
where D(t) is the discount factor relative to time t. In
the following we indicate with the symbol • averages of
the loss distribution.
Risk measures: PDImpact and PDRank
In our framework, the nodes are characterized
by an initial probability of default PD(t) ≡
(PD1, PD2, . . . , PDN ) at time t = 0. Hence, even in ab-
sence of any external shock, the system can suffer losses
during the simulations within the considered time frame
of M time periods. The loss distribution so obtained, and
in particular the expected loss Ltot(PD) can be used as
5the base-line for comparison with the losses in presence of
stress. Since a distress of the network is described as an
increased probability of default of a set of nodes, δPD,
we can introduce the so-called Probability of Default Im-
pact (PDImpact), indicated as C(δPD), of the stressing
perturbation δPD onto the initial probability of default
PD as:
C(δPD) = Ltot(PD+ δPD)− Ltot(PD) (10)
where the two terms on the right hand side are respec-
tively the average loss of the network in the presence and
absence of the additional stress δPD.
Analogously, we can also introduce a node centrality
measure, that we name the Probability of Default Rank,
or PDRank, for assessing the relative importance of each
financial institution. The PDRank of node i is obtained
multiplying the probability of default of node i by the
additional average loss experienced by the network due
to the default of node i:
PDRanki = PDi ·
(
Ltot(PD
Di)− Ltot(PDIi)
)
(11)
where PDDi is the initial probability vector in which the
probability corresponding to node i has been set to 1 at
t = 0, while PDIi is the initial probability vector where
the probability corresponding to node i has been set to
0 and kept at the value 0 for each time t ≥ 0 (the node
cannot default during the simulation). Therefore, the
quantities Ltot(PD
Di) and Ltot(PD
Ii) represent respec-
tively the average loss, during the simulation, when node
i defaults at time 1, and when node i cannot default (the
average loss that the network would suffer anyway irre-
spective of the node i). In practice, PDRanki of node
i measures the expected loss “due” to node i. As the
already known DebtRank, it is expressed as a monetary
value and can be used to rank the nodes in terms of their
’systemic risk’. Introducing PDRank and PDImpact we
maintain the characteristics of DebtRank: a monetary
value for the ’centrality measure’ of a node and the sen-
sitivity to a distress of the network also in absence of
actual default.
A further characterization of a network, which we
name PDBeta, can be obtained by quantifying the sen-
sitivity of the system to a percentage increase of all the
initial probabilities of default. Assuming an approximate
linear relationship between the PDImpact C(δPD∗) ob-
tained for an increase of the probabilities of default
δPD∗ ≡ PD · x/100 and the percentage of increase x,
we can define PDBeta as follow:
PDBeta =
C(δPD∗)
x
(12)
In this way PDBeta represents the variation of PDIm-
pact for a unitary percentage variation of the probabili-
ties of default.
FIG. 3: A network with two nodes is used to show
the characteristics of different models. The system is
characterized by nodes with a total asset A, a capital E, a
loss given default LGD and a probability of default PD. The
correlation between the nodes is ρ, while the exposures of a
node to the default of the other are respectively a12 and a21.
IV. RESULTS
To illustrate how our model works and its differences
with respect to the standard approaches, we will study
the case of a network with only two nodes, which can eas-
ily be treated within a Markov chain approach. We will
then present the results of numerical simulations of the
PD model for the network of the European Globally Sys-
temic Important Banks. Among the main findings, we
will show cases where the system presents “strong con-
tagion” effects characterized by an increased risk when
the average correlation between nodes is lower. Such be-
haviour is counter-intuitive as the lower the correlation
the lower should be the tendency of defaulting together
triggering large losses. This is indeed what happens in
standard credit risk models where only one time period
is taken into account. Analysing multiple time periods,
as in the PD model, the contagion effects start playing
a role and, in appropriate circumstances, they dominate
the dynamics. When this happens, a lower correlation in-
creases the probability of single node defaults in the first
time steps. The network then experiences an increase of
the probability of default of the remaining nodes, and
severe losses follow in the subsequent time steps.
The two banks case
Let us consider the network with two nodes shown
in Fig. 3. The network is described by the exposure
a12 of node 1 to node 2, the exposure a21 of node 2 to
node 1, and by the correlation ρ between the two nodes.
Moreover, we have the following quantities associated
with the nodes: the capitals E1 and E2, the total assets
A1 and A2, and the probabilities of default PD1 and
PD2.
6Network theory approaches
The first network theory approach that we consider
is the so-called Furfine model [31], which is based on a
domino effect mechanism that propagates the stress of a
node if and only if it is severe enough to wipe out the
entire capital of the neighbouring nodes. The process
starts with the application of an external shock (a loss)
S to, let us say, node 1, but the stress is not propagated
over the network if S ≤ E1. If instead S > E1, node 1
defaults with a loss A1 · LGD1. Node 2 will in turn de-
fault if and only if a21 · LGD1 > E2, with an additional
loss A2 ·LGD2. The problem of this model is that it does
not feel the stress on the network. For example even if
S is just below E1, nothing happens as the capital can
absorb the stress, and similarly if the impact a21 ·LGD1
is just below E2.
In order to overcome this limitation the Generalized Deb-
tRank model can be used instead. In this model, the
stress applied to node i is described by a continuous vari-
able hi(t) = 1−Ei(t)/Ei representing the percentage loss
of the capital at iteration t, with hi = 1 corresponding to
a default [33]. In our network with two nodes, the node
variables are updated at each iteration as:
h2(t+ 1) = min[1, h2(t) +
aˆ21
E2
(h1(t)− h1(t− 1))]
h1(t+ 1) = min[1, h1(t) +
aˆ12
E1
(h2(t)− h2(t− 1))] (13)
where we have introduced the quantities aˆij = aij ·LGDj .
Again the process is started by the application of an ini-
tial stress 0 < S < 1 to node 1 at iteration t = 0. Thus,
we set h1(0) = S and h2(0) = 0, with h1(−1) = h2(−1) =
0. The algorithm is iterated until the stress on the nodes
converges to the values h˜1 and h˜2, and the loss is calcu-
lated as:
Loss = h˜1E1 + h˜2E2 (14)
This algorithm presents the opposite problem with
respect to the Furfine model as it can be extremely
sensitive to external shocks. For example, in case of
aˆ21
E2
> 1 and aˆ12E1 > 1, the shock is amplified at each
iteration until at least one of the two nodes defaults.
This unrealistic outcome occurs no matter how small the
initial loss is. In the actual financial system the capital
of a bank is usually greater of an exposure toward any
other bank, however instabilities as outlined above can
nevertheless arise in financial networks as described in
Bardoscia et al (2017) [16].
Standard credit risk approach.
The example with two nodes is particularly convenient
as Monte Carlo simulations are not necessary and the
system can be described in terms of a four states Markov
chain [48]. In order to further simplify the treatment we
study the case where the nodes are symmetric. In par-
ticular we assume they have the same numerical values
for the parameters A, PD and LGD. The four states of
the Markov chain are named according to the defaulted
nodes: {0} no node has defaulted, {1} node 1 has de-
faulted, {2} node 2 has defaulted and {12} both nodes
have defaulted. Starting with the system in state {0},
in the following time step, it will move to state {1} with
probability p0→1, to state {2} with probability p0→2 and
to state {12} with probability p0→12. Examining Fig. 4
it is evident that standard credit risk calculations per-
formed by credit risk managers cannot probe the entire
chain because they use only a single time step. For ex-
ample, the probability of default of node 2 given the de-
fault of node 1, indicated as p1→12, would start playing
a role only from the second time step. The transition
probabilities of the Markov chain can be obtained from
the parameters of the Gaussian latent variable model as
follows:
p0→12 = Φ2(Φ−1(PD),Φ−1(PD), ρ) (15)
p0→1 = p0→2 = PD − p0→12 (16)
p0→0 = 1− p0→1 − p0→2 − p0→12 (17)
Calling pi0(t), pi1(t), pi2(t), pi12(t) the probabilities of be-
ing, respectively, in state {0}, {1}, {2} and {12} at time
t, we can see from Fig. 5a that pi12(t = 1) ≡ p0→12 is
an increasing function of ρ and, according to Eq. (15), it
only depends on ρ and PD, and not on other network pa-
rameters. This is what bank risk managers would expect
as their credit risk model would normally consider only
one time step. In order to calculate a loss distribution
at time t, which is the goal of any model to assess credit
risk, we need to consider the loss associated with each of
the four states of the Markov chain: L0 = 0, L1 = L2 =
A ·LGD,L12 = 2A ·LGD and their corresponding prob-
abilities pi0(t), pi1(t), pi2(t) and pi12(t). The average loss
and the quantiles at the desired confidence level can be
calculated from the loss distribution and can be used to
assess the risk of the system. For example, in a standard
credit risk model with t = 1, the average loss is given
by equation Ltot(t = 1) =
∑
s={0},...{12} Lspis(t = 1). In
the analysis above we have neglected the discount factor
from time t to time 0.
The PD model.
In analysing the system with the PD model we ex-
tend the parameters that we take into consideration, and
maintaining the symmetry of the two nodes we also set
E1 = E2 = E, with a12 = a21 = a and aˆ = a · LGD. In
order to calculate the loss distribution we use the Markov
chain as in Fig. 4, with multiple time steps M . M is an
7input of the analysis and depends on the total time length
that we want to investigate. It should be chosen to be
large enough so that the probability of being in a partic-
ular state is sufficiently spread along the chain, but small
enough so that the probability of being in the absorbing
state, with all the nodes that have defaulted, is not over-
whelming. We are going to use M = 7 periods ∆t of one
year each. We will consider different values of the capital
E and the corresponding values of σ obtained inverting
Eq. (6). Using the PD model with the Merton update
described in Section ”Merging the two approaches: the
PD model framework” it is possible to obtain p1→12 and
p2→12 as updating equations depending on the network
parameter a, on the node characteristics A and E and on
the volatility σ:
p1→12 = p2→12 = 1− Φ
(
ln( A−aˆA−E )− 0.5σ2
σ
)
(18)
The additional transition probabilities of the Markov
chain can be obtained considering that {12} is an ab-
sorbing state, hence p12→12 = 1, and from the fact that
the sum of the transition probabilities from one state to
all the states that can be reached with one time step
must add up to 1. For example p1→1 can be obtained as
p1→1 = 1− p1→12.
Results at odds with the common intuition appear in the
PD model, where we find the emergence of what we have
called a strong contagion regime, in which the probability
of suffering the maximum loss (double default) decreases
with increasing correlation between the two banks. This
is shown in Fig.5b where we plot the probability of a dou-
ble default pi12(t) after t = 7 time periods versus ρ, and
we explore different values of the initial capital E. We no-
tice that, for the three largest values of E, the probability
pi12(t = 7) increases with increasing correlation ρ. This
behaviour is not different from that found in the single-
period simulation reported in Fig. 5a. Conversely, for
the three smallest values of E, the probability pi12(t = 7)
is a decreasing function of ρ. This occurs because the
probabilities p1→12 and p2→12 are larger for small values
of E and the “contagion” paths [p0→1, p1→12] and [p0→2,
p2→12] become dominant compared to the direct route
[p0→12]. When this happens, we have a strong contagion
regime, where the probability pi12(t = 7) decreases with
increasing correlation ρ, as it is less likely that the sys-
tem moves to states {1} or {2} during the first iterations
hence it cannot take “advantage” of the high transfer
probability links p1→12 and p2→12.
The loss distribution can be derived analogously to the
standard credit risk approach, associating each state to
a relative loss. In particular, Fig. 5b can be inter-
preted as showing that the probability of experiencing
a loss corresponding to the double default state {12},
Ltot = 2A · LGD, is a decreasing function of ρ for suffi-
ciently small capital E.
FIG. 4: The Markov chain corresponding to a two
banks network. The chain has four states: {0} no node
has defaulted, {1} node 1 has defaulted, {2} node 2 has de-
faulted, {12} both nodes have defaulted. The arrows rep-
resent the possible transitions between states with their as-
sociated transition probabilities. The continuous black ones
connect the states that can be reached from state {0} in a
single time step as in a standard credit risk model, while the
dashed arrows refer to transitions that are taken into account
only by the PD model.
The network of European Global Systemically
Important Banks
We have applied our model to analyse the data col-
lected by the European Banking Authority (EBA) rel-
ative to the European Global Systemically Important
Banks (GSIB). As it is standard in this field of inves-
tigation, a complete set of data relative to the exposure
matrix {aij} is not available as it is sensitive information
and usually not even the regulators have it. We have
followed the practice commonly accepted in the research
community [16, 28, 29] of inferring the bilateral network
of exposures using the data that we do have, namely, for
each node i, the component of the total exposures
∑
j aij
and the total liability
∑
j aji toward the other financial
institutions.
We have used a new algorithm described in Methods
to create a set of ten bilateral networks and we have
used averages over the ensemble to perform our analy-
sis. The initial values of the probabilities of default have
been obtained from public information about the credit
rating of the banks and from statistics available on the
Fitch website (see Methods), while the other character-
istics of the banks such as the capital E and the total
asset A are available from the EBA data set. Following
[43], we will use a single value of pairwise correlation co-
efficient ρ for each non-diagonal entry of the correlation
matrix and where not otherwise specified, we will assume
ρ = 0.5 which can be interpreted as the average correla-
tion between banks. To complete the set of parameters
we have assigned a LGD = 0.6 to each financial institu-
tion. Setting the same LGD for all the GSIB banks is a
8FIG. 5: Probability of double default versus ρ in a
standard credit risk approach and in the PD model.
We consider a symmetric two node network, with parameters
A = 200 bn EUR, PD1 = PD2 = 0.001 and aˆ = 1 bn EUR.
(a) In the standard credit risk approach, the probability pi12
of being in state {12} after one time step increases mono-
tonically with the correlation ρ between the two nodes. (b)
In the PD model with 7 time periods of one year each, the
probability pi12 of being in state {12} is an increasing or de-
creasing function of ρ depending on the initial capital E. The
chart can also be interpreted as the probability of undergo-
ing a loss Ltot = 2A · LGD, which is approximately the loss
corresponding to a double default.
reasonable approximation given that they pertain to the
same industry sector and geographic area. The value of
LGD = 0.6 has been chosen according to the analysis
in Ref. [49]. The numerical results obtained in this sec-
tion reflects the approximations and assumptions made
and are conservative as we have not included the likely
reaction of regulators and banks after the first defaults
(replenishing their capital for example).
The strong contagion regime
We have used a PD model with 7 periods of one year
each, and we have performed 100000 Monte Carlo simu-
lations for each period and changed the network from one
year to the next one by using both the Merton and the
Linear update rules. We have repeated the process for
different values of ρ and for each of the ten networks of
the ensemble created by the algorithm in Methods. The
distributions of the total loss Ltot experienced by the
network under different values of average correlations ρ
are shown in Fig. 6. While the distribution relative to
the Merton update presents a relatively low risk of se-
vere losses, for the Linear update the risk is considerably
higher. This is to be expected as, in the Linear update,
the probability of default of the nodes increases substan-
tially after the first defaults, triggering further losses in
the following time steps. The Linear update distribution
shows also the defining characteristic of what we have
called strong contagion regime, i.e. a regime where the
probability of extreme losses decreases with increasing
correlation, as it is less likely to have defaulting nodes
during the initial time steps that would act as catalysts
for the contagion process. As described for the two banks
case, these effects are not present in standard credit risk
models and, if not properly taken into account, could
bring to an underestimation of the risk. The PD model
with the Merton update is the financially relevant model
and, for the GSIB data, it does not exhibit strong con-
tagion effects, so it is reasonable to question if they can
arise in actual financial networks. The answer is affir-
mative, as the Linear update can be seen as an approxi-
mation of the Merton update when the asset volatilities
are extremely high (see Fig. 2). The same effects can
occur in the Merton update also when the capitalization
of the banks is insufficient. To show this, in Fig. 7 we
report the loss distribution obtained reducing the capital
of the banks by 50% and using the Merton update. In
this case, the capital is not enough and any shock can
increase drastically the probability of default, hence the
strong contagion effect of decreasing risk with increasing
correlation.
Furthermore, the error bars in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 do not
substantially modify the shape of the loss distributions
from which the risk measures are derived, implying that
the results of the PD model are robust with respect to
the uncertainties in the network construction. It appears
that the constraints imposed by knowing the total finan-
cial exposures and liabilities are quite stringent, so that
our analysis is robust and representative of the actual
and unknown matrix of exposures. For this reason, in
the following we will focus our analysis on a single net-
work of the ensemble.
To investigate the sensitivity of the system to a varia-
tion in the probability of default of the banks, we have
calculated the PDImpact as defined in Section ”Merging
the two approaches: the PD model framework”. Fig. 8
confirms the existence of an approximate linear relation-
ship between PDImpact and a percentage increase of the
initial probabilities of default, allowing the definition of
the measure PDBeta in Eq. (12) that can be used, to-
gether with the expected loss Ltot, to gauge the riskiness
of the network. Defining the global asset of the network
as Aglob =
∑N
k=1Ak, we have found Ltot/Aglob = 0.93%
and PDBeta/Aglob = 0.0124% for the Merton update,
and Ltot/Aglob = 5.125% and PDBeta/Aglob = 0.0318%
for the Linear update. As expected, the average loss and
the PDBeta for the Linear update are larger than the
ones relative to the Merton update, reflecting its greater
capability of spreading the contagion.
The critical nodes of the network
We can now analyse the relative contribution of the
nodes to the systemic risk of the network. Table I re-
ports the values of PDRank in billion (bn) of EUR, ob-
tained using the Merton update while in Table II we used
9FIG. 6: Loss distribution obtained with the PD model for the GSIB bank network and for different values of
average correlation ρ. The plot reports the number of counts (relative to 100,000 simulations) with a given value of loss at
the final time interval of M = 7 years. The number of counts with loss equal to 0 are not shown. We have assigned a loss given
default LGD = 0.60 to each bank, so the maximum loss is 60% of the total asset of the system, defined as the sum of the total
assets of the banks. The panel on the right represents the loss distribution obtained using the Merton update where it can be
seen that the risk of a complete collapse of the system increases with increasing ρ as in standard credit risk models. In the left
panel, relative to the Linear update, the tail of the distribution is a decreasing function of ρ due to strong contagion effects.
The error bars represents the maximum and minimum number of counts with respect to an ensemble of networks inferred from
the available GSIB data.
FIG. 7: Loss distribution obtained with the Merton
update when the capital of all the GSIB banks has
been halved. All the other parameters of the PD model
have been set as in the case considered in Fig. 6. The tail of
the distribution is a decreasing function of ρ due to strong con-
tagion effects arising because the network is weakened having
only half of the capital to absorb the shocks. The error bars
represents the maximum and minimum number of counts with
respect to an ensemble of networks inferred from the available
GSIB data.
the Linear update. The ranking of the most important
nodes is different in the two cases and the corresponding
values can vary by more than one order of magnitude for
nodes with a high probability of default such as BFA with
PD = 0.0116 and MPS with PD = 0.0093. These nodes
can act as a catalyst for a chain reaction of losses es-
pecially in a “strong contagion” regime: relatively small
losses can have a dramatic effect on the probability of de-
fault of the impacted nodes and this explains why they
are at the top of the PDRank table in the Linear up-
date case. The ranking implied by PDRank is different
from the one that takes into consideration the total as-
set of the financial institutions (as in a “too big to fail”
approach). This is evident as the PDRank definition in-
cludes the probability of default, which is not related to
the total asset. We can investigate if PDRank can be
explained by the probability of default multiplied by the
total asset. Fig. 9 shows that this is not the case even
if there is a positive correlation. It is interesting to note
that BFA and MPS are well above the regression line in
case of the Linear update (Fig. 9b), which reflects once
again the increased role of the probability of default in a
strong contagion regime.
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FIG. 8: PDImpact vs a percentage increase in the
PD of each node. Approximate linear dependence between
PDImpact C(δPD∗) obtained for an increase of the proba-
bilities of default δPD∗ ≡ PD · x/100 and the percentage of
increase x. In the analysed network , the average loss increase
per 1% increase in the probability of default is about 3.5 and
9 billion EUR respectively for the Merton and for the Linear
update.
PD Capital Total Asset Bank PDRank
0.001 70.4 2252.7 BNP Paribas 10.8
0.001 59.1 1940.3 Barclays 6.7
0.0017 45.5 1034.4 Unicredit 4.9
0.001 51.3 1410.5 RBS 3.4
0.001 25.1 655.7 Commerzbank 3.3
0.001 70.7 1723.0 Credit Agricole 3.0
0.001 64.3 1455.6 Santander 2.8
0.001 63.4 1659.3 Deutsche Bank 2.7
0.0116 11.9 234.8 BFA 2.1
0.001 50.0 1336.6 BPCE 2.0
0.0093 6.6 201.4 MPS 1.9
TABLE I: Top twelve nodes ordered by PDRank, ob-
tained with the Merton update, in the network of
GSIB of the European Union. The data is relative to the
end of 2014 which is time 0 in our simulations. Threshold,
Total Asset and PDRank are expressed in billion of EUR.
V. DISCUSSION
Our model, the PD model, can be used by regulators to
quantify the systemic risk of a financial network in terms
of statistics of a loss distribution in a language that is
familiar to financial risk managers. The banks can be
classified according to their contribution to systemic risk
using the measure that we have called PDRank, while
PD Capital Total Asset Bank PDRank
0.0093 6.6 201.4 MPS 82.2
0.0116 11.9 234.8 BFA 75.0
0.0017 45.5 1034.4 Unicredit 26.0
0.0017 38.2 695.9 Intesa Sanpaolo 20.5
0.001 70.4 2252.8 BNP Paribas 15.6
0.001 59.1 1940.3 Barclays 15.5
0.001 51.3 1410.5 RBS 15.4
0.001 63.4 1659.3 Deutsche Bank 15.3
0.001 25.1 655.7 Commerzbank 15.3
0.001 64.3 1455.6 Santander 15.2
0.001 70.7 1723.0 Credit Agricole 15.2
TABLE II: Top twelve nodes ordered by PDRank, ob-
tained with the Linear update, in the network of
GSIB of the European Union. The data is relative to
the end of 2014 which is time 0 in our simulations. Thresh-
old, Total Asset and PDRank are expressed in billion of EUR.
the resilience of the financial system to external stress
can be estimated with PDImpact. The PD model is a
dynamic model that allows following the evolution of the
system in time, hence it can be used for scenario analysis
and for assessing the likely outcome of policy measures
introduced by regulators. The data relative to the net-
work of bilateral exposures between banks, used by our
model, are usually not available. However, we have found
that our analysis is robust and only weakly dependant
on the specific network inferred given the constraints im-
posed by the available data, namely the aggregated total
exposures and the total liabilities of each bank to the
others. When the capitalization of the banks is insuffi-
cient or in period of extreme volatility, we have identified
a strong contagion regime where initial losses substan-
tially increase the probability of default of the nodes so
that it is likely that further losses ensue in the remain-
ing time steps. Crucially we have shown that the sys-
tem can change its behaviour, varying the parameters of
the network, as illustrated with the data relative to the
European Global Systemically Important Banks where
halving the capital would move the system to a strong
contagion regime (see Fig. 7). One of the striking char-
acteristics of the strong contagion regime is that lower
average correlation between nodes correspond to larger
losses. Diversification in this context increases the risk.
This is of extreme importance for banks, and as far as
we know the community of risk managers is not aware of
these effects as their credit risk models cannot capture
strong contagion effects. This in turn can cause banks to
underestimate the capital needed to overcome periods of
crisis with severe consequences for the financial system
stability.
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FIG. 9: PDRank as a function of Total Asset · PD.
PDRank (m EUR) of a financial institution is shown as a
function the probability of default of the corresponding node
times its total asset. Panel (a) and (b) refer to the Merton
and the Linear update respectively. While there is a positive
correlation, PDRank cannot be explained completely with a
linear regression and the differences can be thought as due to
network effects.
VI. MATERIAL AND METHODS
A. Default correlation vs correlation matrix in the
Gaussian latent variable model
The default correlation ρˆij represents the tendency of
two assets i and j to default together:
ρˆij =
〈δiδj〉 − 〈δi〉〈δj〉√
[〈δ2i 〉 − 〈δi〉2][〈δ2j 〉 − 〈δj〉2]
(19)
where δi = 1 if the node i defaults during the unit time
interval and 0 otherwise. The symbol 〈·〉 indicates the
expectation value of a quantity, so that 〈δi〉 is equal to
the probability of default PDi previously defined, while
〈δiδj〉 is equal to the probability PDij of simultaneous de-
fault of nodes i and j. However, in practice, the matrix
of correlations between defaults defined above is rarely
used as in the general case does not interpolate between
−1 and 1 and it is difficult to calibrate with the avail-
able financial data, given the scarcity of the events of
default. What is used instead are models, such as the
Gaussian latent variable model introduced in Subsection
”The Credit Risk approach”, which describe correlated
events and that imply a value for PDij , hence indirectly,
via Eq. (19), a value for ρˆij .
B. Merton model
Merton model is an option model for corporate default
based on the capital structure of a company [40]. He
considered a simplified model with a company having
total assets A(t) and capital E(t) at time t and a single
liability B(t) = A(t) − E(t) expiring at time T = t +
∆t. The value of the total assets A of the company is
assumed to follow a lognormal random process with drift
µ and volatility σ. A default occurs if during a simulation
A(t) falls below the value B(T ) at time T . In that case
the assets of the company are not enough to pay back
the liability B(T ), the capital E(T ) = A(T ) − B(T ) is
negative and the stakeholders would declare bankruptcy
to avoid the payment of the difference. With standard
stochastic calculus techniques it is possible to calculate
the probability of default as [36]:
PD = 1− Φ
(
lnA− lnB + (µ− 0.5σ2)∆t
σ
√
∆t
)
(20)
where Φ is the cumulative Gaussian distribution.
C. Inferring the network
We describe a new algorithm to infer the network of
bilateral exposure from the aggregated total asset and
liabilities of each bank toward the other banks. In the
literature, a maximum entropy algorithm [50] has often
been used but it is known that it might not represent
the best choice for recreating a realistic interbank net-
work [51] and different alternatives have been proposed
[26, 52, 53]. We want to capture the fact that small fi-
nancial institutions are more inclined to have connections
with a small number of bigger banks. The level of expo-
sure tends to be above a certain minimum value as the
creation of a credit relationship involves a maintenance
cost. This was already addressed by Anand et al. [54]
but here we propose an alternative algorithm that we find
more intuitive and that allows controlling over the min-
imum exposure amount and the “degree of attraction”
between smaller nodes and bigger ones. The main idea
is to match asset with liabilities, building the adjacency
matrix in steps: 1) The smaller borrower nodes choose
first where to get the money from; 2) The lender (a dif-
ferent node) is chosen randomly with a probability that
is proportional to its remaining assets to the power of
alpha (alpha being the parameter for tuning the degree
of attraction between heterogeneous nodes and set to 1
for the calculations in this paper). 3) The loan amount is
chosen as a percentage of the total liabilities of the bor-
rower node and represents the minimum exposure that
it is convenient to exchange, constrained by the ’resid-
ual’ assets of the lender and the ’residual’ liabilities of
the borrower. 4) The adjacency matrix and the residual
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asset and liabilities amount are updated. 5) The pro-
cess continues till all the assets are matched with all the
liabilities. 6) If at the end remains one node that can
borrow money only from itself, the procedure re-routes
some of the previous loans so that the adjacency matrix
is completed with zero values on the diagonal.
D. Data Availability
The datasets analyzed during the current study are
available on-line as follows. As part of its mandate,
the European Banking Authority collects data annually
from the Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIB)
in the European Union and publishes the results on its
website where we have chosen the data from the year
2014 (https://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-
data/global-systemically-important-institutions/2015).
The data set contains the fields “Intra-financial system
assets” and “Intra-financial system liabilities” that we
use in our model to recreate the individual exposures
using the algorithm described in the previous paragraph.
The field “Total exposures” provides a proxy for the
total assets Ai. The capital has been obtained from
another study performed by EBA in cooperation with
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB): ’The EU-wide
stress test’, that aims at ’assessing the resilience of
financial institutions to adverse market developments’
(http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-
wide-stress-testing/2014/results).We have selected the
Banks that were in both exercises and we identified 35
institutions. The initial probability of default has been
obtained from the table “Financial Institutions Average
Annual Transition Matrix: 1990-2014” in the document
“2015 Form NRSRO Annual Certification” obtained
from Fitch website www.fitchratings.com.
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